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Equality
Abstract and Keywords
This article first discusses key equality guarantees in law today. It then focuses on 
different understandings of the right to equality: as either a principle or an individually 
enforceable claim (the status); as an ‘empty idea’, a rationality test, or a ‘substantive’ 
right (the content); as a right of individuals or for groups (who bears the right?). It next 
examines equality as categorically distinctly structured as opposed to or as similar to 
other liberty interests (the test); as a general entitlement or as a specific guarantee to 
address particular inequalities, either separate or intersecting (the inequalities); and as 
general or specific regarding the application in distinct areas of life (the reach). Finally, 
the article addresses the often crucial question of whether equality as a fundamental 
right is directed exclusively against the state, or whether it may also have binding effects 
on other actors.
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IN law, equality is everywhere. But equality (Greek, isotes; Latin, aequitas, aequalitas; 
French, égalité; German, Gleichheit) is not just a legal issue, as an idea of justice, a 
principle, or a right. Not least since the French Revolution, equality has also been a 
political claim, and one of the most controversial ones, oscillating between egalitarianism 
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(associated with Marxism or socialism, but also with the welfare state) and anti-
egalitarianism (associated with capitalism, (neo)liberalism, but also with a liberal state). 
In philosophy, equality is a canonical topic with controversies around the meaning of 
equality, the relation between justice and equality, the material requirements and 
measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the scope of equality (equality among 
whom?), and its status within a theory of justice (the value of equality).
In law, several notions of equality inform constitutionalism around the globe. Equality is 
foundational to the idea of justice, to law as a form or a mode of regulation, in that the 
very idea of legal norms implies that they apply to all legal subjects alike. In a sense, 
equality forms the bedrock of the rule of law and a key component of constitutionalism. 
This is based on a notion of substantive universal moral equality of all human beings, an 
embrace of individuality. It was not endorsed by Aristotle or Plato, but has been widely 
held since the Stoics who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings. Similar 
positions can be found in early New Testament Christianity, in the Talmud, and in Islam, 
as well as in Hobbes,  Locke,  and Rousseau,  culminating in Kant's moral 
philosophy.  In Kant's categorical imperative, a recognition of equal freedom for all 
rational human beings forms the sole principle of fundamental human rights.  This is the 
idea that many a constitutional preamble alludes to (examples include the United States, 
India, Egypt, Kenya, etc ‘We the people’). It is also the idea of fundamental equality which 
informs most liberty rights (‘everyone has the right’).
More recent constitutions not only emphasize individual, but also address collective
notions of belonging which undergrid diversity. This is often the case in postcolonial 
settings,  as well as in transnational constitutionalism, as in the EU  which rests upon 
non-discrimination among member state nationals.
In addition, notions of equality also oscillate between recognition and redistribution, a 
right to be among equals and a right to an equal share. Constitutional law in fact merges 
both. Political rights are not only about recognition, but in fact distribute political power, 
or agency. Similarly, economic rights may appear to redistribute resources, but also 
regulate recognition in that they not only prevent poverty, but also marginalization (thus, 
precarization) and social exclusion.
Finally, a constitutional right to equality may address specific inequalities, such as 
privilege or disadvantage, in clauses that prohibit discrimination regarding race, sex, 
disability, age, etc. It may also target different spheres of application, as political equality, 
equal taxation, equality in education, equal access to employment etc.
To grasp the multiplicity of relevant rules and meanings, I first discuss key equality 
guarantees in law today. I then focus on different understandings of the right to equality: 
as either a principle or an individually enforceable claim (the status); as an ‘empty idea’, 
a rationality test, or a ‘substantive’ right (the content); as a right of individuals or for 
groups (who bears the right?). I next examine equality as categorically distinctly 
structured as opposed to or as similar to other liberty interests (the test); as a general 
entitlement or as a specific guarantee to address particular inequalities, either separate 
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or intersecting (the inequalities); and as general or specific regarding the application in 
distinct areas of life (the reach). Finally, I address the often crucial question of whether 
equality as a fundamental right is directed exclusively against the state, or whether it 
may also have binding effects on other actors.
I. Key Equality Guarantees
Equality clauses are found at all levels of law, ranging from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (which promises equality in Articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 16, 21, 23, and 26), 
numerous provisions in the human rights treaties of the United Nations and of regional 
systems, to national, subnational, or local and communal constitutions. Equality 
provisions are also found in statutes and in by-laws of non-state entities, like a private 
club, a university, or a corporation. As in all multilevel law, equality law does not always 
amount to a coherent body of norms, but as an instance of legal pluralism, equality law is 
more or less consistent, sometimes inherently ambivalent and even at times 
contradictory.
In global human rights law, equality features prominently in all key documents, from the 
non-binding Universal Declaration to the binding International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), as well as several treaties that address specific inequalities (discussed 
below). In international customary law, equality is not explicitly guaranteed, although the 
prohibitions against genocide and against slavery can be understood as targeting the 
most murderous aspects of a systematic inequality that fly in the face of equal dignity for 
all human beings. Regional human rights systems guarantee the right to equality.  The 
EU Treaty references international human rights law and emphasizes sex equality,  while 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights also addresses distributive aspects of equality.  Also, 
under the ICCPR, even measures taken in states of emergency may not discriminate, 
since ‘there are elements or dimensions of the right to non-discrimination that cannot be 
derogated from in any circumstances’.  Moreover, seemingly all national constitutions 
feature an equality clause.
While equality is ubiquitous in treaties and constitutions, language differs significantly, as 
do levels of specificity in defining the meaning and scope of equality. Often, constitutions 
and treaties guarantee a general right to equality. This is phrased as a right to equal 
treatment, equality before the law or of the law, a principle of non-distinction, and, in 
more recent texts, non-discrimination, or a combination of these terms and concepts. As 
an example, in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, Article 27 (‘equality and freedom from 
discrimination’) guarantees equality before the law, equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law, the equal enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms, equal treatment of 
and equal opportunities for women and men, and prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination. Much more succinctly, the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, 
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adopted in 1868, proclaims that no state shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws’.
However, even such general clauses often also institute inequalities. In section 2, the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution specifies that ‘Indians not taxed’ will not 
be represented, and that the right to vote is limited to ‘any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States’ who has not 
participated ‘in rebellion, or other crime’. Similarly, the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man in 1789 did not extend its equality guarantee  to women, inspiring an alternative 
draft by Olympe de Gouges in 1791; also, in spite of lobbying efforts, it did not prohibit 
slavery. At present, the ICCPR guarantees equality (Art 26), but only prohibits the death 
penalty regarding persons below age 18 and pregnant women (Art 6(5)) and reserves the 
right to vote for nationals (Art 25). Also, the non-binding Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam (1990) proclaims a right to equality but, based on a notion of essential 
difference, also endorses several inequalities otherwise not accepted in human 
rights law, particularly regarding religion and gender.  Similar inequalities are enshrined 
in the Arab Charter of Human Rights, revised in 2005.  Thus, equality may be 
simultaneously guaranteed and limited in constitutional and human rights law; the 
supreme law of the land may thus promise equality but also entrench inequality and 
institutionalize discrimination. Some constitutions expressly address this internal tension, 
as Malaysia in Article 2(2).  While equality as a fundamental right is thus ubiquitous, it 
differs enormously in status, binding force, content, rigor of enforcement or structure, 
inequalities targeted, and reach.
II. The Status of a Right to Equality
Equality may be guaranteed and interpreted in both constitutional law and human rights 
law, as either a principle or as a right. This may be explicit in the legal text, but it may 
also be implied by reference to different procedural options. Whether or not one is able to 
lodge an individual complaint before a constitutional court or human rights body and to 
present claims subject to enforcement, can distinguish a right from a principle.
As a principle, equality informs the very idea of law as a general norm. Some 
constitutions command the state to pursue equality, as in the German Basic Law.  And 
often, equality informs all other human rights as is expressly stated in clauses that read 
‘Everyone has the right to … ’. Equality is, then, the ‘starting point of all liberties’;  it 
informs all human rights.  As an example, under Article 14 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), discrimination is expressly prohibited in relation to one of the 
substantive rights set forth in the Convention.
More specifically, some constitutions feature distributive notions of equality. As such, 
equality is closely linked to social rights (see Chapters 49 and 50), but it is technically 
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guaranteed as a principle that informs the interpretation of liberties. Then, a liberty may 
turn into a right to participate, or a right of equal access, which in fact amounts to a 
specific equality test (below).
Much more often, equality is guaranteed as a free-standing human right against 
discrimination. In the European human rights system, this move to an independent right 
was achieved by way of an amendment  and in court decisions.  In many constitutions, 
equality is expressly guaranteed as such. It is an individual right directed against 
unequal treatment, and more specifically recently, against discrimination. Some 
constitutions refer to historical disadvantage, like section 15 of the Canadian Charter. 
Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) lists
any distinction, exclusion or restriction … which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise … of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field.
Legal language thus already points to a variety of concepts that inform the content of a 
right to equality.
24 25
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III. The Content of a Right to Equality
Equality has been described as many things, among them an empty idea, a guarantee of 
rationality, a formal right, a substantive right, and there are discussions contrasting 
equality of opportunity and equality of results. There is thus no single concept that 
defines equality as a right, but rather several controversial interpretations of it.
The starting point of all understandings of equality is that equality is not identity or 
sameness, but that equality implies, based on the moral equality of all human beings, 
being different but fundamentally similar. However, the focuses of equality theories do 
shift. Some focus on the claim that all individuals are equal, others on the claim that all 
should be treated alike, some ground their arguments in metaphysics, some in politics. In 
the present context, equality means to not differentiate between individuals in irrational 
ways, because we are essentially equal. This is a right to equal treatment, derived from a 
concept of humanity, featured most prominently in Kantian rationality. This symmetrical 
and formal approach goes back to Aristotle and has been discussed in law as a similarly 
situated test.
As such, equality amounts to the prohibition against arbitrariness, and thus to an 
obligation to act rationally. Some philosophers conceptualize equality in that tradition, 
that is, as a right to rationality,  a right to justification,  a right to treatment of persons 
as equals, with equal concern and respect,  an ‘egalitarian plateau’,  a promise of a 
deliberative reasoning before something is done. The more we consider a social 
distinction irrational, the more a right to equality prohibits making that distinction. In the 
history of equality jurisprudence, the focus on rationality has however served to weaken 
claims for equal treatment. The weakness of this equality concept derives from the 
similarity test: the more we understand people or situations to be different, the less we 
demand equality for them. To name an infamous example, German Nazis relied on this 
concept to argue that since Jews are not similar to ‘Aryans’, they could be progressively 
excluded from the community of Germans, up to the point of mass murder. The 
US Supreme Court based its endorsement of segregation between ‘Blacks’ and ‘Whites’ 
on a ‘separate but equal’ doctrine in Plessy v Ferguson,  claiming that a separation was 
not unequal treatment. In the 1954 decision of Brown v Board of Education,  the 
Supreme Court eventually found that such a differentiation bears the seed of 
discrimination, such that ‘separate educational facilities are inherently unequal’.
Even if we would argue that segregation violates human dignity and the right to life, a 
similarity test generally allows for the exclusion and marginalization of some for being 
‘different’, rather than strive for equality for all. Today, widespread examples are law on 
pregnancy, and law on abortion. The more one defines these to be unique, dissimilar, or 
‘different’, the more one can justify ‘different’ treatment, which, in contexts of gender 
inequality, has the effect of discriminating against women.
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At the other end of the interpretive spectrum, a right to equality may be understood as a 
prohibition of any distinction, because to distinguish between humans who are essentially 
the same is irrational. Constitutions may therefore feature a general equal treatment 
clause, directed against arbitrariness, and specific equality clauses, as rights against 
discrimination. Examples are Article 3 of the German Basic Law, section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Article 32 of the Polish Constitution, or 
Articles 14 to 18 of the Constitution of India. Such specific clauses may then be 
understood to strictly prohibit any distinction which takes into account a difference that 
‘doesn’t make a difference’. For example, a right to sex equality may then be understood 
as a right against ever using sex to make a difference (which is discussed as 
‘degendering’ in gender studies). Such an approach would indeed solve many problems of 
people who do not conform to a rigid sex-gender system, that is, intersexuals or people 
with a transgender identity. If we do not allow for sex to ever justify a difference, to make 
a distinction, it would not matter who we are sexually. On the other hand, an overly 
radical degendering may hinder an adequate understanding of diversity and pluralism, 
and of sex based inequality as well, that is, if one renders sex-differentiated data on 
inequality to be problematic. As another example, a concept of equality as a right against 
distinctions may inform radical secularism or laicity, which prohibits any reference to 
religion or belief as discriminatory. This may indeed solve problems of marginalized 
beliefs and non-believers, but it would also produce complicated clashes between a desire 
to pursue one's spiritual life and a state that does not allow for that to matter (see 
Chapter 43). Thus, a rule that will not allow for any religiously inspired clothing will 
affect mainstream Christians much differently than devout Muslim women or orthodox 
Jewish men. As another example, an understanding of citizenship as radically ‘national’ 
and not diverse or pluralistic regarding ethnicity may inform consistent politics of equal 
treatment, but it may, as in France, also serve to refuse any collection of data that would 
bring to light discriminatory social structures. Therefore, a symmetrical or a radically 
‘blind’ approach with a focus on distinctions does not allow us to address the complicated 
cases relating to equality in a pluralist world. Rather, an asymmetrical approach to 
equality seems fit to address the power relations involved, which lead to injustice in the 
form of discrimination.
A starting point of constitutionalism is that people are fundamentally equal in that they 
are human beings (based on metaphysics, or on politics), but the whole point about being 
human is the ability to differ, by choosing to lead one's own life, in situations that differ 
tremendously, around the globe, but also within a region, a city, a social entity. This is 
why a constitutional right to equality is often interpreted as a right to recognition of such 
diversity. Historically, the focus has shifted from an emphasis on similarity to a 
recognition of difference, and eventually, dominance.
Then, equality is a claim to diversity and a call for equal treatment. This tension has been 
called by authors like Minow ‘a dilemma of difference’ in equality law;  it is a central 
challenge to politics of multiculturalism and pluralism, to minority rights and other group 
based privileges (see Chapter 53). Philosophers such as Gosepath have argued that in 
light of this, equality is not one concept, but a bundle of principles to ensure social 
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justice.  In defining the content of a right to equality, we need to grapple with the fact 
that a right against a distinction does indeed target something a person may want to be 
positively identified with (eg a right to sex equality for people who identify as male or 
female, a right against disability discrimination for people who want to be recognized as 
facing specific barriers, a right against ageism for people who identify as old or young). 
Formal equality may not help us in certain situations where we may need an 
accommodation of difference.
Equality law may therefore be seen as directed against a difference we care for. Again, 
this is why it is so important to distinguish between an understanding of equality as a 
right of or to differences and equality as a right against discrimination. The challenge is 
particularly evident in the case of rights against discrimination relating to a disability. 
Disability is, in a world shaped according to specific standards, a status of non-conformity 
with that standard, a way of being different. Equality law cannot fight that difference, but 
needs to accommodate that feature of human diversity, in light of the power relations in 
play. Thus, human rights law like the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities from 2006 obligates states to respect and accommodate disabled people as 
equals (Arts 3 and 4). It calls upon us, indeed an obligation, to change the world into a 
barrier-free environment for all (Arts 5(3), (4) and 9). Equality then means to modify the 
standards we live with, rather than modify a person who does not ‘fit’. Here, equality law 
becomes a right to transformation, to change the structures and to redistribute power, 
rather than a right to change oneself to fit in.
In other instances, equality law may have to accept a difference we care for but may be 
directed at those aspects of that difference which amount to dominance, resulting in 
disadvantage. Feminist lawyer and theorist MacKinnon has famously rejected the 
difference approach, and conceptualized the dominance approach to equality. As a 
substantive right, in this view, equality is a claim to equal treatment in recognition of 
one's differences: it is the prohibition of a difference amounting to an inequality. Thus, it 
is not difference but dominance that matters.  It is called asymmetrical, substantive, or 
material accommodation of those who are disadvantaged, with a focus on dominance, 
subordination, discrimination. Here, equality is a right against being hurt, against 
violating the harm principle of liberal constitutionalism according to which your liberty 
ends when others suffer.
The substantive approach is dominant in much human rights law.  Several constitutions 
explicitly prohibit ‘discrimination’, and courts are very clear that authorities that engage 
in or tolerate violence against historically disadvantaged groups or minorities violate a 
right to equality. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in Alekseyev v Russia,
stated that lack of police protection for gay rights activists in Russia is a violation 
of human rights.  It is, according to the Court, discrimination prohibited by equality 
law.
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In addition, constitutional law may explicitly name the harm it is meant to stop. For 
example, the South African Constitution names racism and sexism as inequalities a 
constitution shall not tolerate.  Also, the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms, states that
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
In jurisprudence, it is the Canadian Court which articulated this approach in Andrews v 
Law Society of British Columbia.  Justice McIntyre explained that the similarly situated
test as stated … is seriously deficient in that it excludes any consideration of the 
nature of the law. If it were to be applied literally, it could be used to justify the 
Nuremberg laws of Adolf Hitler. Similar treatment was contemplated for all Jews. 
… Thus, mere equality of application to similarly situated groups or individuals
does not afford a realistic test for a violation of equality rights.
Rather, ‘consideration must be given to the content of the law, to its purpose, and its 
impact upon those to whom it applies, and also upon those whom it excludes from its 
application.’ Finally, the Justice added, the rights to equality ‘are granted with the 
direction contained in s. 15 itself that they be without discrimination. Discrimination is 
unacceptable in a democratic society because it epitomizes the worst effects of the denial 
of equality, and discrimination reinforced by law is particularly repugnant.’ The Justice 
went on to define discrimination:
[it] may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on 
grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has 
the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or 
group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to 
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. 
Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on 
the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of 
discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will 
rarely be so classed.
If equality means more than rationality, but rather addresses substantive issues, 
there are additional questions to answer. A famous controversy addresses the tension 
between equality of opportunity and equality of results. In what is closely related to this 
tension, the Preamble to the Constitution of India promises equality of status and of 
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opportunity. In liberal constitutionalism, it is rather obvious that a right to equality cannot 
mean a right to resources others may aspire to as well, since their liberty interests would 
be violated, in a discriminatory fashion, if the state were to define who gets what or 
belongs where. Rather, liberal constitutionalism ensures that opportunities are equal, 
fairly distributed to all. Based on this, it all depends upon one's understanding of social 
reality: When do opportunities end and results begin?
Affirmative action or positive measures or quota are a case in point. Do laws that promote 
certain individuals who have been discriminated against in the past or who are 
underrepresented in a particular context violate or implement the right to equality? Does 
it violate the right to equality if women or members of linguistic minorities or African-
Americans or disabled people are given a job instead of an equally qualified man, member 
of an ethnically defined majority, or a person not physically challenged? Most cases arise 
in the area of employment, but affirmative measures are also controversial in politics as I 
discuss below.
Generally, many courts have stated that affirmative action promotes equality, rather than 
violating it. More specifically, the German Federal Constitutional Court stated in 1992 
that ‘the provision that men and women shall have equal rights is designed not only to do 
away with legal norms that base advantages or disadvantages on sex but also to bring 
about equal opportunity for men and women in the future. Its aim is the equalization of 
living conditions.’  Also, the South African Constitutional Court stated in Hugo,  a 
complex case brought by fathers that were excluded from being pardoned from a prison 
term like mothers:
The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not only 
to avoid discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged groups. 
It seeks more than that. At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies 
a recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is 
the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal 
dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. The 
achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will 
not be easy, but that that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or 
overlooked.
However, it all depends on the legal scheme chosen in a given context. The European 
Court of Justice has developed a sophisticated jurisprudence in the area of employment. 
The Court stated in Kalanke  that laws designed to promote women over equally 
qualified men in male-dominated employment sectors are meant to ‘counteract the 
prejudicial effects on women in employment which arise from social attitudes, behaviour 
and structures’.  But not every law will do. The Court stated that
a national rule which provides that, where equally qualified men and women are 
candidates for the same promotion in fields where there are fewer women than 
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men at the level of the relevant post, women are automatically to be given priority, 
involves discrimination on grounds of sex.
In fact, there may be good reasons to prefer an individual man. Affirmative action 
then needs to guarantee an opportunity, but not an ‘automatic’ result. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of India, in Uttar Pradesh v Pradip Tandon,  struck down a rule which 
reserved places in medical school for candidates from rural areas because it was 
overbroad. It emphasized, however, that the government may very well design better 
schemes to promote ‘socially and educationally backward classes of citizens’.
In Marschall,  the European Court of Justice explained that
it appears that even where male and female candidates are equally qualified, male 
candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates particularly 
because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of 
women in working life and the fear, for example, that women will interrupt their 
careers more frequently, that owing to household and family duties they will be 
less flexible in their working hours, or that they will be absent from work more 
frequently because of pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding. For these reasons, 
the mere fact that a male candidate and a female candidate are equally qualified 
does not mean that they have the same chances. It follows that a national rule in 
terms of which, subject to the application of the saving clause, female candidates 
for promotion who are equally as qualified as the male candidates are to be 
treated preferentially in sectors where they are under-represented may [be 
consistent with the right to equality] if such a rule may counteract the prejudicial 
effects on female candidates of the attitudes and behaviour described above and 
thus reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the real world. 
However, … such a national measure specifically favouring female candidates 
cannot guarantee absolute and unconditional priority for women … [But if the 
rule] contains a saving clause does not exceed those limits if, in each individual 
case, it provides for male candidates who are equally as qualified as the female 
candidates a guarantee that the candidatures will be the subject of an objective 
assessment which will take account of all criteria specific to the individual 
candidates and will override the priority accorded to female candidates where one 
or more of those criteria tilts the balance in favour of the male candidate. In this 
respect, however, it should be remembered that those criteria must not be such as 
to discriminate against female candidates.
Put differently, affirmative action rules promote equality if they themselves do not 
reinforce stereotypes and perpetuate discrimination, not even through the back door of a 
savings clause.
This is also a key issue in US jurisprudence on affirmative action in education. The end of 
formal segregation, Brown v Board of Education, did not end substantive inequality. In 
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particular, US universities have sought to promote minorities and diversify student bodies 
with a variety of rules which have repeatedly been attacked in the courts. There is a long 
line of cases decided by the US Supreme Court, the last to date being Grutter v 
Bollinger,  where the Court stated that:
We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. … This means that such 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further 
compelling governmental interests. … When race-based action is necessary to 
further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring 
requirement is also satisfied.
And then, the Court says: ‘context matters’. In the case, Michigan Law School, as 
part of its goal of ‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and 
broadly diverse’, seeks to ‘enrol a “critical mass” of minority students’. The Law School's 
interest, the Court stated,
is not simply to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a 
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin. That would amount to 
outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional. … Rather, the Law 
School's concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational 
benefits that diversity is designed to produce.
And, the Court continued, ‘These benefits are substantial’. In addition, the Court noted, 
the Law School did not perpetuate stereotyping:
The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘any belief that 
minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic 
minority viewpoint on any issue.’ … To the contrary, diminishing the force of such 
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one that it 
cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.
To achieve this, a system must be narrowly tailored, it cannot use a quota system—it 
cannot ‘insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from 
competition with all other applicants’. Instead, a university may consider race or ethnicity 
only as a ‘“plus” in a particular applicant's file’, without ‘insulat[ing] the individual from 
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats’. In other words, an 
admissions program must be ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of 
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on 
the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same 
weight.’
More generally, equality also touches on the limits of democracy. Who shall be allowed to 
be treated like a citizen? Who loses the right to be treated as a citizen? Not only 
postnational and multilevel democracies have to grapple with political equality, global 
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migration has resulted in multinational populations, which also form transnational 
networks. The German Federal Constitutional Court decided that ‘there can be no 
democratic state without a body politic, … the people, from whom all state authority 
emanates’, but held that this body must that be a ‘cohesive, unified group’.  Later, the 
German Basic Law, as many other EU member state laws, was amended to extend local 
voting rights to EU citizens. However, ‘third country nationals’ have no vote. In addition, 
many states do deny voting rights to citizens living permanently abroad, such as Korea.
Today, in light of a post-Westphalian global order, discussions of cosmopolitanism revive 
calls for a right to political equality. Basically, equality then means to have a resident 
voice in local matters, independent of nationality. This is not a new notion, since it has 
been known to the Stoics as well as Erasmus von Rotterdam, to Grotius as well as Kant, 
and more recently, to philosophers like Rawls, Tilly, Benhabib, Pogge, or Held. But it is, 
generally, not the law.
Finally, many conflicts arise when states strive to ensure representation of all factions of 
society in politics, including minorities. In France, the Constitutional Council rejected
minority rules in Elections in New Caledonia.  India is known to employ several 
mechanisms in that realm. In Murthy et al v India,  the Supreme Court upheld reserved 
seats for members of backward classes in local self-government, the panchayats. It used a 
strict proportionality test, which results in ordering a maximum level of reserved seats, 
but also leaves room for minority quotas. The Court made a distinction between election 
and selection:
The nature and purpose of reservations in the context of local self-government is 
considerably different from that of higher education and public employment. … 
[T]he principles that have been evolved in relation to the reservation policies 
[there] cannot be readily applied in the context of local self-government. Even 
when made, they … can be much shorter.
Socio-economic deprivation, it stated, may result in disadvantages when people are 
selected for a job, but may not necessarily have such effects when people are elected for 
a seat. According to this jurisprudence, the right to equality is not a formal claim, but 
needs to be applied in context. Similarly, the Hong Kong court struck a balance between a 
strict right to equality in elections, and an equally valid claim to ensure participation of 
minorities, by referring to international law, the ICCPR. In Tse Kwan Sang v Pat Heung 
Rural Cttee  it stated that even rules that ensure representation of indigenous people 
need to be non-discriminatory in nature, that is, may not exclude women. In the US case
Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez,  that balance however tilted against a woman who 
sought equal rights in a minority context in the United States and inspired a lasting 
controversy on the tension between group equality rights and individual ones.  Overall, 
equality law confronts complicated questions which arise from our multiplicity of 
belongings today.
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IV. The Scope: Who Bears the Right to
Equality?
Equality is a right to address the fundamental similarity of human beings as well as the 
differences among them, to eventually target discrimination. As a fundamental human 
right, it is a claim for individuals, but equality also invites collective claims, as in the case 
of Martinez against her Pueblo kinship.  As another example, equality may motivate a 
state to impose an official language on its territory, but equality will also invite claims by 
people who identify with another language, as a right to differ. Often, courts then seek a 
rather pragmatic compromise among competing goals. In Latvia, the Constitutional Court 
upheld a law which empowered the state to transcribe German last names into Latvian 
spelling, yet required the state to add a ‘special note’ with the original name in 
documents.  But does this solve the tension between a collective entity and the 
individual?
Famously, Article 27 of the ICCPR addresses rights of minorities, yet is interpreted as an 
individual right.  Also, some national constitutions protect minorities, and constitutional 
law may also grant rights of recognition and redistribution to corporations or 
other legal entities. Most prominently, much constitutional law grants rights of self-
determination to churches and religious communities, often based on the notion of equal 
treatment of all religious beliefs. However, such rights, similar to rights of linguistic or 
cultural minorities, not only serve to protect their existence, but can also be used to 
curtail the rights of their members in relation to such organizations or groups. A tension 
arises around ‘Minorities within Minorities’  or more precisely: of diverse individuals in 
seemingly homogenous groups. Such a concept of equal rights for groups assumes that 
such collectives may be clearly distinguished from one another, and that people always 
belong to any one group, rather than many. Empirically, this is highly problematic 
because most groups have boundaries which are both blurred and shifting, and because 
individuals live different group identities or share multiple group characteristics. Thus, 
the construction of groups in law, as ‘legal groupism’,  collides with a notion of 
individual rights. In light of this, some argue that there are two aspects of the right to 
equality: to prevent discrimination and to support minorities.  Others conceptualize 
equality as an individual right for respect of a socially situated identity, which eventually 
protects a group as well. In Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, Justice White argued in his 
dissent that equality strives to protect individuals from arbitrary and unjust actions, 
including those of their tribal governments.
V. The Test
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We have seen that a concept of equality as a guarantee of rationality and a right to 
justification informs a similarly situated test, most famously known as the test applied by 
the US Supreme Court, but explicitly rejected by Canadian jurisprudence and not applied 
by the European Court of Justice and others. The more equality is understood as a right 
against discrimination, the more a test moves away from a comparative exercise and 
resembles a liberty test, directed against a violation of a fundamental interest or need. In 
addition, equality allows for an interpretation of liberties as social rights. Thus, there are, 
in the world of constitutional law, three different tests for equality: a similarity 
assessment, a discrimination test (a negative ‘freedom from’ state intervention), or an 
egalitarian test (a positive ‘claim to’ access, distribution, resources).
Regarding the egalitarian test of equality as a positive claim to something, there are two 
versions of equality guarantees: as a minimum guarantee of basic resources or as access 
to resources without discrimination. Many European constitutions contain social or 
welfare state clauses.  The Hungarian Constitutional Court has interpreted the right to 
social security—that is, basic economic equality—as a principle only (in Article 70E). 
Conversely, the German Federal Constitutional Court has famously interpreted the 
principle of the welfare state in Article 20 of the Basic Law, in conjunction with the right 
to dignity, Article 1, as an individual right to a minimum guarantee of existence,  an 
obligation to care for ‘those in need’, like people with physical or mental 
handicaps, to secure ‘the basic conditions for a dignified existence’.  This may also be 
understood as a right to basic economic equality: the state must ‘provid[e] the basic 
conditions for a humane existence of its citizens. … As long as these basic conditions are 
not at stake, it lies in the discretion of the legislator to what extent social assistance can 
and is to be granted.’  In contrast, the discrimination test serves to protect individuals 
from the state discriminating against them either explicitly (direct discrimination) or by 
way of seemingly neutral measures (indirect or disparate impact discrimination). Here, 
the decisive step is not to compare someone to others, but to understand whether 
someone has been harmed.
However, equality as a right to equal access to liberties may also amount to a 
constitutional obligation of state action. This is explicit in derivative equality clauses that 
guarantee equal enjoyment of liberties.  The ECtHR as well as the UN Human Rights 
Committee have used what could be called the equal access test in cases on sex, sexual 
orientation, or marital status discrimination in social security.  Another example is the 
EU law on equal pay for equal work with an elaborate jurisprudence on sex equality 
regarding renumeration. If the state offers or enforces or protects something, it has to do 
this for all citizens or even residents alike. Courts do not determine what is distributed, 
but courts ensure that there must be no discrimination in distribution. This has been 
stated by the ECtHR. In a case of a woman who sought divorce from an abusive husband, 
but had no money to pay for legal advice, the ECtHR argued:
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fulfillment of a duty under the Convention on occasion necessitates some positive 
action on the part of the State; in such circumstances, the State cannot simply 
remain passive and there is … no room to distinguish between acts and omissions. 
The obligation to secure an effective right of access to the courts falls into this 
category of duty.
However, comparative studies indicate that such positive rights claims are less successful 
than negative ones.  It should be noted however, that several fundamental rights 
catalogues of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries do explicitly set forth rights to 
social security, to work and to protection against unemployment, to rest and leisure, 
including periodic holidays with pay, to an adequate standard of living, to education, and 
to the protection of one's scientific, literary, and artistic production.  This is often 
labeled as the rise of a new ‘generation’ of human rights.
However, the jurisprudence of rights to equal access may be understood as an application 
of the right to equality to liberties, which eventually informs enforceable social rights. 
This shatters the categorization of human rights as ‘generations’, a conceptual frame that 
follows the history of dominant ideas.  Rather, one may understand both as components 
of constitutionalism.  The first generation, according to the common narrative, 
consists of civil and political rights, while the second generation features economic, 
social, and cultural rights, with a third generation for collective rights to development, 
sustainability, etc. Yet as a cross-cutting right, equality is a principle that informs the 
liberties of the first generation, and the defining feature of the second generation, 
originating in notions of distributive justice, the socialist traditions of the Saint-Simonians 
of early nineteenth-century France and various emancipatory movements in different 
regions, at different times, and with different inequalities to struggle against. These 
movements in fact, just like the current efforts to fight poverty, sought to break free of 
the chains of inequality, and thus demanded liberties to further that claim. In some ways, 
a call for equal rights is thus a reaction to a limited concept of liberty, which tolerates or 
even legitimizes the exploitation of people for profit, be it in colonies or factories. 
Different from that, one may also understand equality to inform all rights to liberty. Some 
courts do thus employ equality to safeguard fair contracts, or emphasize that no person 
can have his or her dignity or enjoy a liberty if economically or socially backward, for 
example the Indian Supreme Court in Kesavananda v Kerala.  The same court stated that 
‘socio-economic democracy’ is built into the Indian constitution, in Ahmedabad Municipal 
Co v Nawab Khan et al.
Overall, equality and the notion of social rights are thus closely related, exemplified in 
Article 2 of the ICESCR, in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and 
in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, while granted separately in 
the European Social Charter (revised in 1996). The close relation is evident in cases on 
equal access to water, which are currently rather prominent. The South African Court 
held that not every citizen has a right to the same type of access, but that it must 
nonetheless install a proportionate scheme which delivers water, in light of limited 
resources, to all.  Also, equality informs much jurisprudence on health care, since 
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unequal access to medical treatment may easily be read to constitute discrimination 
rather than just a decision on how to distribute social goods. Examples include the
DiBella Treatment case in India,  in which the International Criminal Court held that 
there must be equal access to treatment. In Latvia, the Constitutional Court held in 2005 
that childcare cannot be limited to parents not working. In Egypt, an Administrative 
Court stopped a new drug-pricing system, because it would violate the right to equal 
access to drugs of all Egyptians if prices were not kept low.
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VI. The Inequalities
Philosophers tend to ask: Equality ‘in what respect’? This is also a key question in law. 
Constitutions and human rights treaties mostly contain a general equality clause, but very 
often also name specific inequalities, either separate from each other or intersecting, and 
either in exhaustive lists or in non-exhaustive lists. Such lists may be seen as naming 
paradigmatic examples of structural or systemic discrimination, which, if non-exhaustive, 
do promise equal rights in analogous cases as well.
Historically, the call for equality was a rejection of specific inequalities, and at least a call 
for justification, and as such a truly modern right. Neither nobility nor place of birth nor 
religion nor sex nor certain physical features (still termed ‘race’) shall make a difference, 
which is what older equality clauses promise. Gradually, sexual orientation, 
disability and age and genetic features are added to such lists. Furthermore, some 
constitutions feature the prohibition of discrimination of people from particular regions, 
like the mountains, which indicates that social deprivation and exclusion may be related 
to geographic location. However, equality law does usually not prohibit economic 
inequalities. The US Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent School District v 
Rodriguez,  expressly declined to recognize the poor as a suspect class for equal 
protection analysis. Also, DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services,  may be understood to hand distributive questions regarding state protection 
via welfare programs over to ‘democratic political processes’.  However, even in the 
United States, some state constitutions oblige the legislature to care for the poor.  And 
again, much law addresses economic discrimination in combining liberty claims with 
equality to inform rights of access, as social rights (discussed above).
As one prominent example, the South African Constitution from 1996 names racism and 
sexism as key targets,  and also lists ‘race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth’ as specific inequalities the Constitution shall strive to erase. 
The constitution of Kenya, in 2010, prohibits discrimination ‘on any ground, including 
race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth.’  The European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, drafted in 2000, prohibits discrimination on ‘any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or 
belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.’ The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
names ‘race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status’,  and protects women and 
children in additional charters.  In the global human rights system, general equality 
clauses with basic lists have been supplemented with specific conventions that target one 
inequality at a time, namely racism,  sexism discriminating against women,  ageism 
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regarding children,  racism and xenophobia regarding migrant laborers,  and ableism/
disability.
Although such lists—either exhaustive or not—seem similar, and imply an analogy of 
inequalities, there is a tendency to treat inequalities unequally. The German Basic Law 
emphasizes sex equality in Article 3(2), lists specific aspects which should not amount to 
privilege or disadvantage in Article 3(3)(1), and provides an affirmative guarantee 
regarding disability in Article 3(3)(2). Similarly, the UN human rights treaties differ in 
scope and structure, and often do address sex inequality separately (ie Article 3 of the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR), but also emphasize that several inequalities often 
intersect. Discrimination does not focus on one characteristic or ground only, but 
subordinates individuals in a multidimensional way, where the specific interdependency 
of sex/ual orientation, ethnicity, ability, age etc matter.
In addition, even ‘classic’ items on the list are controversial. The paradigmatic example is 
‘race’, prominent in many constitutions to target racism, yet in itself an expression of a 
racist theory, a theory which claims that people belong to different races. This has been 
addressed by the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban in 2001, which strongly rejected ‘any 
doctrine of racial superiority, along with theories which attempt to determine the 
existence of so-called distinct human races.’
As another example, the meaning of dis/ability is often unclear. Also, the meaning of sex 
became controversial. While some constitutional jurisprudence treats a right to sex 
equality to also protect people who love people of the same sex against discrimination,
others treat this as a different topic, either analogous to other listed grounds,  or 
accepted as a ‘rational’ distinction. The controversy is displayed in a US decision, Romer 
v Evans,  where the majority struck down a state referendum that banned laws that 
prohibit discrimination against homosexual or bisexual practices or relationships, thus 
limiting the reach of equal rights, while the dissenters would have upheld such laws 
which they interpreted as only prohibiting ‘special treatment’ of sexual minorities. Based 
on a constitution that names sexual orientation as a ground in need of equal rights 
protection, the South African Court has consistently held that there is no reason 
whatsoever to disadvantage people because of the sex of the person they love.  But even 
when such express protection is absent, fundamental rights jurisprudence around the 
globe gradually extends equality protection to sexual minorities. In Salgueiro da Silva 
Mouta v Portugal,  a gay father was protected against the denial of parenthood because 
of his sexual orientation. The argument that a child should grow up in a ‘traditional 
Portuguese family’ was rejected as discriminatory. In 2011, the Brazilian Supreme Court 
held that all rights granted to ‘stable unions’ must be granted to homosexual and 
heterosexual relationships alike.
Also, some see ‘sex’ as relating to men and women only, while others have used sex 
equality guarantees to protect transsexuals as well as transgender and intersexuals 
against discrimination. However, cross-dressing or transvestism has not been accepted as 
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such an inequality.  This is based on an understanding of listed inequalities as 
characteristics which people cannot choose to live or not live, but that form a component 
of one's identity. Therefore, many legislators state very clearly that equality regarding sex 
or sexual orientation does not protect sexual practices that harm others, like sexual abuse 
of children or pedophilia. Rather, non-harmful sexual practices are protected as part of 
private life.  In light of this, same-sex couples may enjoy family life, Schalk and 
Kopf v Austria,  yet were not granted a human right to be treated like heterosexuals 
regarding marriage.
VII. The Reach
Similar to the differences it underscores in listing specific inequalities, constitutional law 
like human rights law targets inequalities in different areas of life, thus varying in its 
reach.
As a starting point of constitutionalism, the basic notion of universal moral equality 
informs political equality, thus democracy, by requiring that a political system equally 
recognize all those who are governed by it.  Here, equality guarantees voice in 
categorical contrast to regimes which formally distinguish classes of citizens, as in 
apartheid, colonialism, or caste systems. This is why courts have generally subjected 
elections to a strict equality standard. Some states strip citizens of voting rights for being 
imprisoned,  while the South African Court extended the right to vote to prisoners, in
August v Electoral Commission,  similar to the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, in
Sauvé v Canada.  The Canadian Supreme Court, however, also upheld an exclusion from 
membership in parliament for people convicted of an illegal practice related to voting.
The South African Court, although strict regarding prisoners, however upheld an ID 
requirement to ensure equality in that one person has not more than one vote, even if 
such requirement imposes an additional burden on people. Although ‘the importance of 
the right to vote is self-evident and can never be overstated’, the South African 
Constitutional Court stated that
the mere existence of the right to vote without proper arrangements for its 
effective exercise does nothing for a democracy; it is both empty and useless, 
which is why the state may require special IDs because and when the old IDs were 
issued by the apartheid government on a racial basis and thus ‘constitute a 
powerful symbol and reminder of a shameful past.
However, Justice O’Regan dissented: since a large number of voters carried the older ID, 
one should not disenfranchise them by asking for another form, ‘in a country where such 
a right is only in its infancy’. Formal requirements are different form economic 
expectations. The US Supreme Court stated that the right to equality in elections is 
violated by a state ‘whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an 
electoral standard’.  Nor may local voting rights be tied to property.  But it remains 
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highly controversial whether less direct property-related opportunities to influence 
elections, like party or campaign funding by corporations, violate the right to political 
equality. The US Supreme Court upheld such financial power,  while many 
constitutional systems at least require full transparency and often mandate absolute caps 
or tax deduction caps on such donations.
Closely related to political equality is equality before the law, as equal access to 
law enforcement and equal treatment in the legal system. This is why many constitutions 
feature rights to fair trial, rights to public hearings in court, and rights to access to 
justice. Again, some courts interpret equality as a right to equal access in fact, that is, a 
mandate to support poor people who want to bring a case, a public defender system, and 
similar safeguarding measures.
Another constitutional dimension of equality focuses on distribution, as a right to socio-
economic equality. As discussed above, this is often constructed as equal access to a 
liberty, a social dimension of fundamental rights. More specifically, tax law is also very 
often subjected to rigid yet formal equality standards, in that everyone shall be taxed 
based on individual economic status. In fact, however, many constitutional courts are 
regularly confronted with tax measures that disparately burden people in a given society. 
In addition, several constitutions and all social rights catalogues expressly address 
equality in employment. As one example, EU law prohibits sex discrimination in pay.
Finally, equality rights may also extend to cultural recognition, a right to cultural equality. 
More recent constitutional and human rights law addresses equal respect in the sense of 
pluralism in that they guarantee both for equal treatment and non-discrimination but 
simultaneously affirm diversity, heritage, tradition, and culture. Examples include the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 2, as well as Articles 8 and 10 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Often, such equality law is guaranteed 
in the context of education and rights to schools, where constitutional courts may protect 
minority curricula or institutions. More specifically, many constitutions and human rights 
treaties take particular care regarding equality of families, in that they guarantee equal 
rights for children born in or outside marriage, or guarantee a right to equal access to 
marriage and against forced marriage, often using age as a proxy to indicate that 
children shall not marry since one cannot know whether it is based on free will, absent 
coercion. Again, the meaning of fundamental rights has changed significantly. 
Historically, this has been understood as a right against sex discrimination consisting in 
not to have daughters married off. While today this remains a key issue, it also needs to 
be regarded as a right to protect men from forcibly being married to women they do not 
know.
VIII. The Binding Force of a Right to Equality
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Generally, constitutions limit state power, as do human rights. However, inequalities are 
often deeply embedded in our societies, which is why a right against discrimination may 
be rendered ineffective if it is limited to address state action only. Regarding political 
equality, it may suffice to have a constitutional right to vote and to stand for elections, as 
in Article 39 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, as the relevant domain is 
exclusively within the purview of the state. But regarding economic, social, and cultural 
equality, private actors also engage in discrimination, whether intentionally or not. 
Therefore, although the binding force of fundamental rights to equality is particularly 
controversial, it is more likely than liberty interests to be expanded to cover private 
actors. According to the German doctrine of third party effect, constitutional law does at 
least address public enforcement of private acts. According to EU equality law, private 
actors, both in employment as in markets of goods and services, are bound by strong 
equality directives. Also, UN human rights law expressly addresses some inequalities in 
private spheres, as does CEDAW to protect women in all walks of life. Thus, equality may 
be more than a negative right against the state, and it may inform a positive obligation of 
states to act against discrimination.
In the area of human rights, committees have argued for a state obligation to 
prevent discrimination by public and by private actors.  Similarly, some constitutions 
explicitly extend the binding force of a right to equality to all actors.  But in most 
constitutions, equality is simply stated as a right, with no further specification. Then, 
general standards of constitutional law apply: courts that enforce private law are bound 
by the constitution, and may thus interpret private action, protected as liberty—that is, of 
contracting—to be limited when it amounts to discrimination. As an example, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine of ‘disturbed contractual parity’, to 
stop banks from exploiting naive customers based on rigid credit contracts, or to stop 
companies from harming former employees in contracts which oblige those to not take up 
employment close to their former job.  Here, the general right to equality, in the sense 
of equal standing and recognition based on equal knowledge and competence is applied 
to limit an overly libertarian understanding of liberty. Rather, a fundamental right to 
equality seems to inform a notion of individual rights of socially situated individuals.
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